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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
JAMES MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
E. I. WILSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 9887 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I 
ERROR IN ORDERING JURY TRIAL OVER 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION. 
The plaintiff recognizes the fact that this Court on 
many occasions has held that the grw1ting or denial of a 
jury trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and this fact is not disputed herein. The plaintiff, however, 
does submit that the respondent has cited to this Court 
on Pages 12 and 13 of his Brief, a case which was decided 
by this Court in 1914 which should no longer be persuasive 
in determining the proper procedures nor the pul1>0Se for 
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2 
which demand for jury trial is required. That case was 
decided under a statutory provision, Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917, Section 6782 which provides as follows: 
"Either party to an action of the kind enumerated in 
the preceding section ( 6781) who desires a jury trial 
of the same or of any issue thereof may demand it, 
either by written notice to the clerk prior to the time 
of setting such action for trial, or within such reason-
able time thtreafter as the court may order; or orally 
in open ~court at the time of such setting. • • • •" 
(Emphasis added) 
In the case cited by the respondent on Page 12 of his 
brief, Davis vs. D & R G Railroad Company, 45 Utah 1, 
142 P. 705, this Court determined that the provisions of 
the statute quoted above were not for the benefit of the 
adversary, but were for the benefit of the court in having 
a jury panel on hand when a case was to be decided by a 
jury. Under the particular wording of the statute which 
the court was called upon to interpret, this decision seems 
to be the proper one. Nothing is said in the statute about 
notifying the adverse party or making any demand oo him 
in order for the case to be tried by a jury; therefore., it is 
reasonable to assume that the purpose for which the leg-
islature required demand under the prior statute was to 
allow the court the necessary time to have a jury panel 
on hand and thus not delay those cases called for trial. 
This satutory provision, however, is no longer the 
applicable law with regard to the demand for jW'Y trial 
in the State of Utah. The demand for jury trial is now 
governed by Rule 38 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. That rule provides as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
"'DEMAND. Any party may demand a jury trial of 
any issue trialable of right by a jury by paying the 
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties 
a demand therefor in writing at any time afteT the 
commencement of the action and not later than shall 
be fixed by rule of the court in which the action is 
pending. Such demand may be endorsed upon a plead-
ing of the party.'' (Emphasis added) 
Under this provision the plaintiff respectfully submits 
that the requirement of demand is no longer solely for the 
benefit of the court, ·but is also for the benefit of the ad-
verse party. This seems abundantly clear on the face of 
the provision in 38(b), where it is provided that demand 
must be served upon the other parties involevd in the liti-
gation. Undoubtedly the legislature felt that the other 
parties involved should have the opportunity of reviewing 
the jury panel and have the further opportunity to in-. 
vestigate that panel and look into the backgrounds of 
those who were to be available for jury duty. In light of 
such a purpose, it is clear that the plamtiff in this case was 
not given this opportunity. As was stated in the appellant's 
previous brief, it was not known to the appellant's cOWl-
sel that the trial was to be by jury until five days before 
the date for which trial had been set. Because of other com-
mitments, the appellant's counsel was unable to converse 
with the court concerning this matter and was precluded 
from carrying out ·the necessary interviewing and investi-
gation of those persons who were on the jury venire. Un-
der these circumstances, the plaintiff believes that the trial 
court abused its discretion in permitting a trial by jury. 
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POINT ll 
ERROR IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 8 OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Appellant is aware of the Utah case DeMichele vs: In-
surance Company~ 40 Utah 312, 120 P. 846, which is cited 
by the respondenrt on Page 18 of his brief; however,. the 
appellant submits that the Utah court, by this decision, 
has not_ gone to the ertreme which the respondent seeks to 
take us in his brief. The respondent~ s position seems to be 
that by this decision, the Utah Court. has abolished all ne-
cessity for laying_ the proper fonndation for admitting a 
copy of a document into evidence either by showing a 
demand to produce upon the adverse party or by showing 
that the original document has been lost or destroyed. This 
should nort, and the appellant respectfully urges is not, the 
law of this State. If this were the case, the exception for· 
admitting some carbon copies would indeed be not an ex-
ception, but the· rule, and there would be no necessity for 
requirnng the· original as best evidence. Clearly there has 
been an exception earved out for admitting some carbon 
copies. of documents which are sought. to be introduced 
into eviflence, how.ever, this does not apply to every car-
boo copy of any document. The reasoning which lies be-
hind the exception for some carbon copies is clearly set 
forth by McCormick in his work on evidence, where it. is 
said: 
"Fiere the copy is made by the same stroke of the pen 
or pencil as. the original and there is an anology to the 
practice of signing counterparts where each copy was 
intended to be an equal embodiment of the contract 
or- othe'r transaction. Indeed today connterparts usu-
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ally consist of an original and one or more carbons, 
all duly signed in multipHcate. What makes them 
counterparts is the signing with intent to make them 
equal·; consequently, the doctrine of cQunterparts can 
hardly apply t& the retained carbon copy of a letter-
the writer tloes not intend· the copy to a oommunim-
tion at all." McCormick on Evidence, page 41.9:..20. 
(Emphasis added) 
This, ·then, brings us to the extent to which the ex-
ception for some carbon copies should be extended. It 
should only apply to those documents which were intended 
to be of equal stature; such as contracts between various 
parties when cwbons are a necessity and all involved feel 
that the carbons are of equal starture with the original, and 
each party takes his signed copy with this understanding; 
or; as the Utah Court said in DeMichele vs. Insurance Com:-
pany, supra, cited by the respondent, where business; rec-
ords such, as a proof of loss, are made in duplicate, then 
these carbon eopies. are· clearly meant. to· be of equal stat-
ure and are, therefore, to. be treated as duplicate. originals. 
This exception should nort be extended to the mere cwbon 
copy of a letter which was never intended to be a com-
munication itself, but was retained in files or as in this case 
allegedly retained in the files of the sender. Were this not 
the case, there would be a clear invitation for the litigants 
to manufacture their own evidence without ever account-
ing for the original which was allegedly sent. Appellant 
respectfully submits that this is not the law of the State· 
of Utah and that this Court, by the decision. in the De .. 
Michele case, did not intend for the exception for cafbon 
copies to extend to this situation. 
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POINT ill 
ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CASE IN CHIEF 
AND IN ITS F AlLURE TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERJDiCT. 
Appellant, in its previous Brief, listed five reasons 
supporting its contention that there was no breach of war-
ranty involved in this case. The third reason of that par-
ticular list is attacked by the respondent on Page 23 of 
hiS Brief.. In seeking to discount, the fact that Mr. Wil-
son was an expe,rienced turkey grower who had over the 
yea.rg faced a problem of feeding his turkeys with various 
types of equi,pment, the counsel for respo!lldent cites to this 
Court the Utah case of Carter vs. Dunn, 117 Utah 180, 214 
P;2d 118. This case does absolutely nothing but cloud the 
issues involved. The appellant here is not trying to avoid 
the breach of implied warranty on the grounds that it was 
not the seller of the equipment, nor upon the grounds that 
the equipment sold was sold under a brand or tradename, 
on the contrary, the appellant says merely that no implied 
wa.ITanty ever arose under the circumstances here involved. 
Mr Wilson did not rely upon the experience and advice and 
the judgment of Mr. Tuttle in selecting this type of eqmp-
ment. He made the choice himself for his OI\VIl particular 
purposes. Therefore, the case which respondent cites in 
his Brief is not in point as applied to the facts as they ex-
ist in our case. 
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POINT IV 
ERRORS IN INSTRUCTING TH!E JURY. 
Respondent, on Page 31 of his Brief, takes the posi-
tion that because of the fact that t:he financial transactions 
and arrangements between the ·respondent and the appel-
lant and third parties was a material part of the litigation 
that the court's instruction No. 18 was, therefore, called 
for. Respot11dent seems to overlook the context in which 
that instruction was given. It is appellant's contention 
that the instruction not only permitted the jucy to investi-
gate and to delve into the financial arrangements between 
the parties involved, but the instruction clearly indicated rto 
the jury that the Court fe1t that the financial transactions 
and arrangements were as the respondent represented them 
to be. Ii is not for the Court to comment on the weight 
and sufficiency of one party's evidence as it pe'rtains to a 
particular issue in the case. Indeed to do so is error. By 
giving this particular instruction, the Court clearly influ-
enced ·the jury as to this material part of the litigation, 
and in doing so error was committed. 
On Page 28 of his brief respondent cites to this Court 
a part of Rule 51, whlch provides that no error may be 
assigned for :the giving or failure to give an instruction un-
less an objection is made thereto. The rule goes on to 
provide, however, that "notwi.rths1mlding the foregoing re-
quirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to 
give an instruction." The respondent seeks to avoid this 
provision by saying that this Court does not have before 
it all the evidence upon which the instructions were based. 
Appellant submits that the errors which its daims were 
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committed are fully supported by the evidence available 
to the Court. Indeed many of the errors are related to 
basic and fundamental concepts in the law and are not 
dependent upon the evidence of certain facts·· as found in 
the evidence. 
Under these circumstances, the appellant respectfully 
submits thaJt this Court may properly review 1he alleged 
errors in instructions, and that in dodng so the Court is 
fully justified by the provisions in Rule 51. Fu.rthennore, 
appellanrt did make objections to many of the instru.ctions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
290 North· University ·Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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